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ABSTRACT. When judges sentence criminal offenders, they begin their analysis with a baseline
sentence established by statutes or guidelines. Cognitive biases will likely cause this initial
baseline to frame judges' thought processes, such that judges will impose different sentences in
identical cases depending on the baseline sentence from which the judge's analysis begins. This
Note shows that baseline framing will lead to disproportionately low sentences in afloor baseline
regime, disproportionately high sentences in a ceiling baseline regime, and sentences
disproportionately clustered around the typical sentence in a typical crime baseline regime.
In order to design the most just sentencing procedures, policymakers must consider
baseline framing effects. This Note suggests that policymakers who want to minimize the
number of sentences skewed by cognitive error should implement a typical crime baseline. In
contrast, policymakers who want to err against inflicting unreasoned punishment should
implement Tennessee's quasi-floor baseline.
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INTRODUCTION
Under indeterminate sentencing regimes, judges use their discretion to
impose sentences that best fulfill the goals of sentencing and are within a given
statutory range.' Sentencing statutes and guidelines provide a framework to
ensure that judges fairly determine an offender's punishment. However,
legislatures and sentencing commissions do not account for the effects of
cognitive biases when establishing sentencing procedures. This Note shows
that the postconviction sentence with which a judge begins her analysis -the
sentencing baseline -affects the sentence imposed, even when the law, the facts,
and the judge are held constant. The thrust of this Note is that policymakers
should account for this baseline framing when designing sentencing guidelines.
Part I introduces the concept of sentencing baselines. Part II surveys
psychological research about cognitive biases and explores how sentencing
baselines frame judicial analysis. It concludes that, in general, baseline framing
causes judges to impose sentences closer to the sentencing baseline than those
judges would impose if their decisions were unaffected by cognitive biases. Part
III discusses baseline framing's implications for designing a normatively
preferable sentencing regime. Every cent of a fine and every minute of
incarceration should be the result of conscious, rational decisionmaking, and
no component of a crime should go unpunished. But, unreasoned increases
and decreases in criminal sanctions caused by cognitive error are inevitable
under any sentencing regime. Policymakers must consider baseline framing
when designing sentencing guidelines in order to create the most just
procedures. Those who want to minimize the number of sentences skewed by
cognitive error should implement a typical crime baseline.' However, this Note
1. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) ("[N]othing in [common law]
history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion- taking into
consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender-in imposing a judgment
within the range prescribed by statute." (emphasis omitted)); see also United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (modifying the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to make
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "effectively advisory" and explaining that the Act
"permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns").
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2oo6) (establishing that one of the goals of the United States
Sentencing Commission is to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing"); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that it is
impermissible for federal judges to improperly calculate the Federal Sentencing Guideline
range, treat the Guideline range as mandatory, fail to consider the goals of sentencing, base
the sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or fail to explain the reasoning behind the sentence).
3. See discussion infra Section I.C for a description of typical crime baselines.
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suggests that Tennessee's quasi-floor baseline4 best reflects the United States'
conception of justice because, like the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
for conviction, it errs against undeserved deprivation of life, liberty, or
property.
This Note is not an argument for lenity; in fact, as discussed in Section
III.C, implementing a quasi-floor baseline may result in higher sentences,
rather than lower sentences, overall. Instead, it is a plea for legislatures and
sentencing commissions to consider baseline framing when designing
sentencing guidelines.
I. BASELINES AND PERSPECTIVES
The sentencing baseline is the sentence with which a judge begins her
sentencing analysis.s In the federal system, the sentencing baseline is a crime's
base offense level. Using the base offense level as a starting point, federal
judges adjust the offense level based on enumerated sentencing factors, then
rely on the adjusted offense level and the offender's criminal history category to
calculate the Guideline range.7 Judges use the advisory Guideline range to
4. See discussion infra Section I.B for a description of Tennessee's baseline.
5. The concept of baselines is adapted from Seth Kreimer's 1984 article, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, in which Kreimer argues that the baselines
for governmental allocations determine the constitutionality of allocational sanctions. Seth
F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem ofNegative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 1293, 1352 (1984). Kreimer explains, "[T]he distinction between liberty-expanding
offers and liberty-reducing threats turns on the establishment of an acceptable baseline
against which to measure a person's position after imposition of an allocation." Id. Kreimer
disavowed his baseline analysis for criminal sanctions because "[a] criminal sanction is in
most cases an unambiguous threat, for the normal course of events in the absence of such a
sanction is not incarceration or payment of a fine." Id. at 1355.
Although the normal course of events in the absence of a conviction is the absence of a
sanction, this observation merely identifies the binary nature of conviction. Kreimer does not
consider the postconviction stage of criminal proceedings when the judge selects a sentence
from within a statutory range. Once guilt is established, a sentence at the ceiling of the
statutory range may be viewed as the default and a reduction in the sentence as a benefit
(similar to the provision of a governmental allocation). Alternatively, a sentence at the floor
of the statutory range may be viewed as the default and an increase in the sentence as a
heightened sanction. These differing perspectives reflect different baselines.
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2) (2010).
7. Id. § 1B1.i(a)(2)-(8).
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assist in determining "a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes [of sentencing].
Sentencing baselines play a pivotal role in framing which components of a
crime are aggravating factors and which components are mitigating factors.
For example, under the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant
who "recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer" receives
a two-level increase in his offense level.' Alternatively, if the offender's base
offense level were two levels higher, the Guidelines could call for a decrease of
two offense levels if the offender did not recklessly create a substantial risk
while fleeing. This hypothetical alternative and the federal Guidelines should,
in theory, lead to equivalent sentences when applied to the same set of facts.
The only difference between the two is that "flight" is an aggravating factor in
the actual guidelines and "not flight" is a mitigating factor in the hypothetical
guidelines. The choice between these guidelines would be insignificant if
judges imposed the same sentence under both regimes. However, if baseline
framing causes judges to impose different sentences for the same offender
depending on the guidelines used, then choosing the most just alternative
becomes critical.
Part II focuses on the interaction between cognitive biases and baselines,
while the remainder of Part I presents three baselines to help structure our
discussion: (1) the ceiling baseline, (2) the floor baseline, and (3) the typical
crime baseline. This Part concludes by briefly describing Virginia's hybrid
sentencing regime, which contains components of all three baselines at
different points in the sentencing analysis.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (20o6); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005)
(holding that mandatory sentencing guidelines would be unconstitutional); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, § IBi.i(b) (requiring judges to consider identified
offender characteristics, policy statements and commentary, and other factors when
imposing sentences); id. § iBi1.(c) (requiring federal judges to consider the purposes of
sentencing codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). The purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553
include
the need for the sentence imposed -(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
g. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,supra note 6, § 3C1.2.
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A. Ceiling Baselines
Using a ceiling baseline, a judge begins her sentencing analysis with the
maximum sentence permitted by law. The judge may reduce the sentence
because of mitigating factors. Oregon's recidivism statute for sex offenders is
an example of this approach. It provides that "[t]he presumptive sentence for a
sex crime that is a felony is life imprisonment without the possibility of release
or parole if the defendant has been sentenced for sex crimes that are felonies at
least two times prior to the current sentence."" The court may downwardly
depart from the presumptive sentence "upon findings of substantial and
compelling reasons."" The presumptive sentence is a ceiling baseline because
life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole is the maximum
sentence available for a felony in Oregon, except for aggravated murder, for
which capital punishment is available."
B. Floor Baselines
Under a floor baseline regime, the judge begins her sentencing
consideration with the sentence appropriate for the least culpable violation of
the law and then increases the sentence based on aggravating factors.
Tennessee establishes a quasi-floor baseline, which is located near the floor but
is not the lowest sentence that could be imposed. In Tennessee, "[t]he
minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the sentence that should
be imposed, because the general assembly set the minimum length of sentence
for each felony class to reflect the relative seriousness of each criminal offense
in the felony classifications."" The judge adjusts the sentence from the
presumptive minimum length after considering relevant factors.'" If no
aggravating factors are present in the offender's case, the Tennessee Code
advises that the offender receive the statutory minimum sentence."
1o. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.719(1) (2009).
Id. 5 137.719(2). Mitigating factors justifying departure include, inter alia, diminished
mental capacity, duress, or compulsion; a finding that the offender's role was minor or
passive; cooperation with the State; and a finding that the harm of the crime is significantly
less than typical. OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0002 (2011).
12. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150.
13. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 40-35-210(C)(1) (2011).
14. Id. 5 40-35-210(C)(2).
is. Aggravating factors include prior criminal history, possession of a firearm, and damage
sustained by the victim. Id. §§ 40-35-113 to -114.
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However, Tennessee law only establishes a quasi-floor baseline because the
Tennessee Code provides that "[i]f the court finds the defendant an especially
mitigated offender, the court shall reduce the defendant's statutory Range I
minimum sentence by ten percent . . . or reduce the release eligibility date to
twenty percent . . . of the sentence, or [apply] both reductions."" Therefore,
the statutory minimum is not the floor. Rather, the floor is 1o% below the
statutory minimum, with a release eligibility date of 20% of the sentence.
C. Typical Crime Baselines
Using the typical crime baseline, the judge begins her sentencing analysis
with the customary sentence given to a crime's "typical offender." The judge
may adjust the sentence based on aggravating and mitigating factors. Many
jurisdictions have instituted typical crime or quasi-typical crime baselines."
Alaska, for example, established presumptive sentences for felonies that
"represent[] the legislature's judgment as to the appropriate sentence for a
typical felony offender (i.e., an offender with the specified number of prior
felony convictions, and with a typical background) who commits a typical act
within the definition of the offense.",, In other words, Alaska's presumptive
sentences reflect the typical crime level.
Meanwhile, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines create a quasi-typical crime
baseline. Recall that under the federal Guidelines, the base offense level is the
sentencing baseline. Judges consider sentencing factors to adjust the base
offense level to a final offense level, which determines the Guideline range.'9
According to the Federal Sentencing Commission, the Commission "intends
16. Id. § 40-35-1o9(b). "The court may find the defendant is an especially mitigated offender, if:
(1) The defendant has no prior felony convictions; and (2) The court finds mitigating, but
no enhancement factors." Id. 5 40-35-lo9(a).
17. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at ch. i, pt. A.i.4 (b) ("carving out a
'heartland"' of typical cases); ARK. SENTENCING COMM'N, SENTENCING STANDARDS GID,
OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS RANKINGS AND RELATED MATERIALS 6 (2009), available at
http://www.arkansas.gov/asc/pdfs/2oo9benchbook.pdf ("Determining the presumptive
sentence for a particular offense is a starting point for the process. The presumptive sentence
is not intended to be the sentence in a particular case unless . . . the offense represents a typical
case . . . ." (emphasis omitted)); CHENEY C. JOSEPH, JR. ET AL., LOUISIANA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL 7 (1994) ("The [Louisiana Sentencing] Commission members
combined their experience to determine designated sentence ranges based on what they
believed to be a 'typical case' arising under the offense of conviction.").
is. Clark v. State, 8 P. 3d 1149, 1150 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added); see ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.55.125 (2010).
19. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at ch. 1, pt. A.l.4(b).
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the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a set
of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes."2 o The
Guideline range, not the base offense level, is intended to reflect the heartland
of cases. If the base offense level were a true typical crime baseline, then it, too,
would reflect the heartland of cases. For both the Guideline range and the base
offense level to reflect a typical crime level, the mitigating and aggravating
sentencing factors would have to balance each other out so that the final and
base offense levels would be equal, on average. If, in practice, the final and base
offense levels are normally different, then the base offense levels do not reflect
the typical crime level, which is instead captured by the final offense level and
the Guideline range. As only the final Guideline range is intended to reflect the
heartland of cases, this Note identifies the federal baseline as a quasi-typical
crime baseline, because the base offense levels are likely only near the typical
crime level.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that even the Guideline ranges do
not actually reflect the heartland of cases. From 2000 to 2010, fewer than 2% of
sentences from the District of Massachusetts were upward departures from the
Guideline range, whereas the downward departure rate ranged from 5.5% to
16.9%.21 If the Guidelines captured the appropriate sentence for a typical
offense, one would expect the number of upward and downward departures to
be equal. Thus, the Guideline range for some offenses is likely higher than the
typical crime level.
D. Hybrid Baselines
Although there can only be one sentencing baseline, jurisdictions may
contain additional baselines at different stages of sentencing. In Virginia,
judges begin with a typical crime baseline after conviction. Once an initial
sentence is determined, judges proceed to the risk assessment stage of
sentencing for nonviolent offenders and sex offenders, at which point the
initial sentence becomes the risk assessment baseline. The risk assessment
baseline is a ceiling for nonviolent offenders and a floor for sex offenders.
The Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission (VCSC) used historical
sentencing data to establish a typical crime baseline for the "initial
20. Id.
21. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REv.
1, 17 (2010). The District of Massachusetts is the only federal court that makes the
sentencing documents needed for empirical research publicly available. Id. at i.
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recommended sentencing range."22 The Virginia Guidelines' departure rates
evidence that the initial range is at the typical crime level. One would expect
equal upward and downward departure rates with a typical crime baseline, and
in 2002, 9.4% of Virginia's sentences departed upward and 9.4% departed
downward."
After determining the initial sentence for a nonviolent offender, the judge
refers to the nonviolent offender risk assessment instrument to decide whether
to convert the sentence from incarceration to an alternative punishment. 4 The
incarceration sentence serves as the new ceiling baseline for the judge's analysis
because it is the highest sentence that the judge can impose.
For sex offenders, the judge refers to the sex offender risk assessment
instrument after selecting an initial sentence.2 ' The instrument recommends
increasing sentences for sex offenders who score above a certain threshold."
This risk assessment baseline is at the floor level because the initial sentence is
the lowest sentence that a judge can impose.
22. The Code of Virginia explains how the initial ranges were calculated:
The initial recommended sentencing range for each felony offense shall be
determined first, by computing the actual time-served distribution for similarly
situated offenders, in terms of their conviction offense and prior criminal history,
released from incarceration during the base period of calendar years 1988 through
1992, increased by 13.4 percent, and second, by eliminating from this range the
upper and lower quartiles. The midpoint of each initial recommended sentencing
range shall be the median time served for the middle two quartiles ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 17.i-8o5 (A) (2010). The Code required the VCSC to increase the midpoint
of the initial recommended sentence for certain crimes. Id. § 17.1-8os(A)()-(4).
23. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND
FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES 8 (2008), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/ PEWExecutiveSummaryvio.pdf.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803(5)-(6); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT
IN VIRGINIA 1, 26 (2002) ("The VCSC designed the risk assessment instrument to identify,
from among eligible larceny, fraud, and drug offenders who would otherwise be
recommended for incarceration by state sentencing guidelines, offenders with the lowest
probability of being reconvicted of a felony crime, and divert them to some form of
alternative punishment.").
25. See VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, ASSESSING RISK AMONG SEX OFFENDERS IN
VIRGINIA 9 (2001) [hereinafter VCSC, ASSESSING RISK], available at http://www.vcsc.virginia
.gov/sex off report.pdf; see also VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT
(2010) (illustrating guidelines and compliance).
26. VCSC, ASSESSING RISK, supra note 25, at io. The recommended increases are: (1) 300% for
offenders who score forty-four or more, (2) oo% for offenders who score between thirty-
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In sum, Virginia's sentencing baseline is a typical crime baseline, and its
risk assessment baselines are ceiling and floor baselines depending on the
offense.
II. FRAMING EFFECTS AND COGNITIVE BIASES
This Part explains how sentencing baselines create framing effects that lead
to distortions in judicial decisionmaking. People rely on heuristics and biases to
"reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to
simpler judgmental operations."" Such cognitive error is pervasive and has
been observed in judges." Although these mental shortcuts can be beneficial,
they may also "lead to severe and systemic errors."9
27. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974); see also JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 56-57 (4th ed.
2008) (listing fifty-three biases that humans exhibit when making decisions).
28. See, e.g., Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, The Last Word in Court-A
Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 717-18 (2005) [hereinafter
Englich et al., Last Word] (asserting that prosecutors in Germany have an unintended
advantage in litigation because their sentencing demand establishes the initial anchor for
sentencing decisions); Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice with
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts' Judicial Decisionmaking,
32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 196 (20o6) [hereinafter Englich et al., Playing
Dice] (finding that legal professionals are influenced by random numerical anchors); Birte
Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the
Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1538, 1545-46 (2001) (showing that German
trial judges exhibit anchoring bias); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001) (concluding that
federal magistrate judges' decisions are affected by anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the
representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J.
Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 583, 638-39 (2003)
(contending that stare decisis is an example of the omission bias); Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 27, at 1128 (presenting influential experiments on cognitive biases); see also Reid
Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk
Manager, 4o AREz. L. REv. 901, 9o6 (1998) (explaining that judges are susceptible to
hindsight bias, though they exhibit this bias far less than do mock jurors); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind,
86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2oo6) (finding that bankruptcy judges succumb to anchoring and
framing effects, but not the omission bias); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About
Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 58-60 (1999) (identifying that state judges (1) exhibit the
hindsight bias, though less so than mock juries, (2) share the common biases of
overestimating small risks and underestimating large risks, but are not noticeably affected
when assessing substantial risks, and (3) exhibit risk ambiguity aversion - "favor[ing] well-
known, established risks to smaller but more uncertain risks").
29. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 27, at 1124.
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How one frames a question should not affect that question's answer. The
"principle of invariance" states that "one's choices ought to depend on the
situation itself, not on the way it is described."o Yet subjects of psychology
experiments tend to violate this principle." These violations are called "framing
effects, because the choice made is dependent on how the situation is presented,
or 'framed."'"
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman have conducted many experiments
demonstrating framing effects. In one experiment, they presented a group of
subjects with the following problem: "Imagine that you have decided to see a
play where admission is $10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover
that you have lost a $10 bill. Would you still pay $io for a ticket to the play?""
Eighty-eight percent of subjects answered that they would, and 12% said that
they would not.34 A second group of subjects was given the following problem:
"Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the admission price of
$10 per ticket. As you enter the theater you discover that you have lost the
ticket. The seat was not marked and the ticket cannot be recovered. Would you
pay $10 for another ticket?"s For this problem, only 46% of subjects answered
that they would buy another ticket. 6
The sizeable difference between the groups' responses demonstrates a
violation of the principle of invariance. Each subject had the choice to buy a
ticket to see the play after having lost ten dollars of value. Merely framing the
ten dollars as a dollar bill or a ticket does not alter the fundamental question
and should have no effect on the response.17
30. BARON, supra note 27, at 264-65 (emphasis omitted).
31. See generally M. Allais, Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel Devant le Risque: Critique des
Postulats et Axiomes de L'Ecole Amiricaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503, 527 (1953) (Fr.)
(introducing the Allais Paradox, a classic problem that lays the groundwork for many
experiments testing framing effects). For an English description of Allais's paradox, see
LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 101-02 (1954)-
32. BARON, supra note 27, at 265. Chris Guthrie et al. use the term "framing effects" to describe a
narrower category of cognitive error. Their term is limited to violations of the principle of
invariance caused by "categoriz[ing] ... decision options as potential gains or losses from a
salient reference point such as the status quo." Guthrie et al., supra note 28, at 794, 796.
33. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing ofDecisions and the Psychology ofChoice, 211




37. Tversky and Kahneman refer to this type of framing effect as "psychological accounting." Id.
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Framing effects have been observed in judges, as well. Building on Tversky
and Kahneman's work, 8 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J.
Wistrich conducted an experiment using 167 federal magistrate judges" that
tested the effects of describing "options as potential gains or losses from a
salient reference point."4 o In the Guthrie et al. study, the judges were presented
with a hypothetical copyright action in which the plaintiff had a 5o% chance of
recovering $200,000 and a 50% chance of recovering nothing.41 Half of the
judges were told, "You have learned that the defendant intends to offer to pay
the plaintiff $60,ooo to settle the case. Do you believe that the plaintiff should
be willing to accept $6o,ooo to settle the case?"" The other half of the judges
were told, "You have learned that the plaintiff intends to offer to accept
$140,000 to settle the case. Do you believe that the defendant should be willing
to pay $140,000 to settle the case?"43 Nearly 40% of the judges presented with
the plaintiff-gains condition said the plaintiff should accept the settlement
offer, but only 25% of the judges presented with the defendant-loses condition
thought that the defendant should accept the offer.44 The two conditions
involved equivalent settlements: in each case, the judges were asked whether
38. Guthrie et al. based their experiment on the "Asian Disease Problem," in which Tversky and
Kahneman gave subjects the following problem:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 6oo people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved....
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 6oo people will be saved,
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved....
Which of the two programs would you favor?
Id. at 453. Tversky and Kahneman gave a second group of subjects the same problem, with
the results of the programs framed differently: "If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.
... If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability
that 6oo people will die. ... Which of the two programs would you favor?" Id.
Even though Program A is identical to Program C and Program B is identical to
Program D, 72% of the subjects in the first group chose Program A and 28% chose Program
B, whereas 78% of the subjects in the second group chose Program D and 22% chose
Program C. Id.
39. Guthrie et al., supra note 28, at 787.
40. Id. at 794.
41. Id. at 796.
42. Id. at 796-97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Id. at 797 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
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the party should be willing to settle for $40,000 less than the expected value of
litigation. Because the difference between the judges' responses was statistically
significant, Guthrie et al. concluded that "[t]he framing of the settlement
decision affected judges in [the] study."4
Similar to Guthrie et al.'s framing effects, baseline framing effects will arise
from classifying sentencing factors as aggravating or mitigating. All sentencing
factors may be presented as either mitigating or aggravating depending on the
initial baseline. Not reducing a sentence because a defendant fled the arresting
officer and increasing a sentence because a defendant fled the officer both result
in higher sentences for the offender who fled. Whether a judge uses aggravating
factors to increase a sentence from a floor baseline or uses mitigating factors to
decrease a sentence from a ceiling baseline, the judge should impose the same
sentence, according to the principle of invariance. However, when a judge is
uncertain whether particular factors apply, she will likely vary her sentencing
analysis depending on how the baseline frames the sentencing factors, just as
Guthrie et al.'s framing affected the judges in the copyright settlement study.
The remainder of Part II explores the cognitive biases that interact with
sentencing baselines to cause framing effects. There are dozens of cognitive
biases that affect decisionmaking.46  Some of these cognitive errors are
unrelated to the sentencing analysis, 47 and many others likely do affect
sentencing analyses but are more strongly influenced by which sentencing
factors are considered than by the sentencing baseline.4' This Note focuses on
45. Id.
46. See BARON, supra note 27, at 56-57 (listing fifty-three distinct cognitive biases).
47. For example, it is doubtful that the congruence bias and logical biases, such as syllogistic
errors and the four-card problem, play a prominent role in sentencing. Cf Jonathan Baron,
Jane Beattie & John C. Hershey, Heuristics and Biases in Diagnostic Reasoning: II. Congruence,
Information, and Certainty, 42 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 88, 89 (1988)
(defining the congruence bias as the use of mechanisms to test hypotheses that are
congruent with presupposed hypotheses); P.C. Wason, Reasoning About a Rule, 20 QJ.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 273, 273-77 (1968) (describing the classic four-card experiment,
which demonstrates logical reasoning errors).
48. Such biases include, inter alia: the availability heuristic, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITWE PSYCHOL. 207, 208
(1973) (defining the availability heuristic as the estimation of probability or frequency by
"assessing the ease with which the relevant mental operation of retrieval, construction, or
association can be carried out"); selective exposure, BARON, supra note 27, at 219 (describing
selective exposure as the interaction with information reinforcing one's beliefs and the
neglect of information challenging one's beliefs); attentional bias, id. at 188 (defining
attentional bias as the "failure to consider alternative possibilities"); and cognitive
dissonance, LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (presenting the
theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that persons will try to avoid psychological
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three cognitive biases -anchoring, the omission bias, and the status quo bias -
because these biases appear to have the strongest relationship to sentencing
baselines. This Note hypothesizes that anchoring and the omission bias cause
judges to impose sentences nearer to the initial reference point-the sentencing
baseline -than those that would be imposed if judges were not influenced by
these biases. Similarly, the status quo bias will reinforce the effects of
anchoring and the omission bias by causing judges to vary suboptimally from
the sentences that the judges typically impose.
A. Anchoring
Scholars have observed anchoring in judicial decisionmaking and identified
sentencing guidelines and prosecutorial sentencing demands as influential
anchors." Anchoring is overreliance on an initial numerical reference point
that causes "absolute judgments [to] assimilate[] toward" the initial value."o
When anchoring affects decisionmaking, "different starting points yield
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values."" To test the
influence of anchors, Tversky and Kahneman conducted a series of
discomfort from holding conflicting knowledge, opinions, or beliefs). See also Michael M.
O'Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 475 (2009) (reasoning that cognitive
dissonance leads to overreliance on sentencing guidelines).
49. Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 28, at 1538 (exploring the anchoring effects of
prosecutorial sentencing demands); Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-
Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/50.pdf (describing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as an anchor); Guthrie et
al., supra note 28 (describing the anchoring effects that influence federal magistrate judges);
Rachlinski et al., supra note 28 (finding anchoring effects in federal bankruptcy judges).
Experiments have also found anchoring in decisions regarding civil damages. See, e.g.,
Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You Get:
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 1o APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526-27 (1996)
(explaining that the amount of damages a plaintiff in a personal injury suit requests
"provides an anchor for estimates of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiffs
injury . . . [and] also serves as an anchor that affects compensation awards"); Verlin B.
Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards in a Mock Civil Trial, 25
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 991, 1016 (1995) (finding that limits on damage awards serve as
anchors to mock jurors and increase damage awards); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina
A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 353, 367 (1999) (finding that "caps on punitive damages influenced punitive
damages awards").
50. Englich et al., Playing Dice, supra note 28, at 188; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
27, at 1128-29 (discussing anchoring as a form of insufficient adjustment from an initial
reference point).
si. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 27, at 1128.
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experiments in which participants were told they would have to estimate a
quantity, such as the percentage of African states in the United Nations. The
experimenters then spun a wheel, generating a number between zero and one
hundred." After seeing the generated number, the subjects were asked to
estimate the percentages. The randomly generated number, the "anchor,"
notably affected the subjects' estimates. The median estimate for the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations was 25% for subjects
with an anchor of ten and 45% for subjects with an anchor of sixty-five.55
Researchers have uncovered anchoring in judges, too. Birte Englich and
Thomas Mussweiler conducted experiments with German trial judges in which
the judges were asked to sentence a hypothetical defendant.5 The judges
received the same hypothetical facts, but the prosecutorial sentencing demands
differed among the judges.5' Englich and Mussweiler found that the sentencing
demands anchored the judges' thought processes, making the final sentences
closer to the demands. Englich and Mussweiler concluded that their "research
has demonstrated that judgmental anchoring has a strong influence on
criminal sentencing decisions." 8
Guthrie et al. conducted a similar study with American federal magistrate
judges.59 Guthrie et al. presented the judges with a hypothetical personal injury
lawsuit. Judges with the no-anchor condition were asked how much they
would award in compensatory damages."o Judges with the anchor condition
were told that "[t]he defendant has moved for dismissal of the case, arguing
that it does not meet the jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of
$75,000."61 These judges were asked how they would rule on the motion and
how much they would award in compensatory damages.6' The fact pattern was
constructed such that "the plaintiff clearly had incurred damages greater than





56. Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 28, at 1538-39.
57. Id. at 1545.
58. Id. at 1547.
s9. Guthrie et al., supra note 28, at 790.
6o. Id. at 790-91.
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no-anchor condition gave an average award of $1,249,000, and the judges with
the anchor condition awarded the plaintiff an average of $882,000. The
difference between the two groups is statistically significant.6" Guthrie et al.
concluded that "[t]he judges in [the] study relied on an anchor-the $75,000
jurisdictional minimum raised by the motion to dismiss-to estimate [the]
damage awards."66 In a similar experiment conducted by the same scholars,
anchors were found to affect bankruptcy judges, too.'
This Section has shown that anchoring has a robust and pervasive effect on
judicial decisionmaking, including sentencing. Moreover, as Judge Nancy
Gertner explains, "[T]he 3oo-odd page [United States] Guideline Manual
provides ready-made anchors."' The most significant of those anchors is the
sentencing baseline, as the baseline is the initial reference point from which all
other sentencing inquiries are conducted. Because anchoring causes judges to
inadequately adjust their decisions from the initial reference point, this bias
will cause more severe sentences if there is a ceiling baseline, less severe
sentences if there is a floor baseline, and a disproportionate number of typical
sentences if there is a typical crime baseline.
The federal Guidelines contain other anchors, too, created by the numerical
adjustments recommended for offense-specific characteristics and general
offense characteristics (such as the offender's role in the offense, obstruction of
justice, and acceptance of responsibility)." Whereas the numerical values for
sentencing factors anchor the judge's valuation of those specific factors, the
baseline anchors the entire analysis, serving as the reference point from which
those sentencing factors increase or decrease the sentence. Furthermore, the
sentencing baseline likely accounts for the majority of an offender's sentence
(and thus is the most meaningful anchor), whereas the sentencing-factor
anchors account for smaller components of an offender's final sentence.
Ryan Scott questions whether the federal Guidelines anchor sentencing.
First, he contends that "the anchoring explanation seems strained because the
Guidelines are supposed to serve as an anchor. . . . Not only is it rational for
judges to give consideration to the guideline range, but it is legally
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 792.
67. Rachlinski et al., supra note 28, at 1236.
68. Gertner, supra note 49, at 138.
69. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, § iBi.1 (discussing the specific and
general Guideline calculation adjustments).
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compelled."7o However, Scott's analysis elides a crucial distinction: guidelines
are supposed to be actively considered in determining the appropriate
sentence; they are not supposed to encourage irrational decisionmaking. Under
federal law, "[e]ven where a district court has properly calculated the
Guidelines, it may not presume that a Guidelines sentence is reasonable for any
particular defendant, and accordingly, must conduct its own independent
review of the [codified sentencing factors]."" Judges are legally compelled to
consciously consider the Guideline range, not to be influenced by cognitive
biases. Although empirically it would be difficult to distinguish between
anchoring and the Guidelines' reasonable persuasiveness, such cognitive error
is nonetheless offensive to procedural justice and to many jurisdictions'
criminal statutes, as discussed in Part III. Minimizing anchoring would not
limit the Guidelines' legally compelled," appropriate influence on sentencing
decisions.
Second, Scott challenges the focus on guidelines' anchoring effects, given
that other sources of information also anchor a judge's sentencing decision:
[T]o the extent the guideline range operates as an irrational "anchor"
just because it supplies some initial numbers, its effects likely are offset
by other anchors tugging in different directions. In every criminal case,
competing "starting point" numbers may be offered by defense counsel,
prosecutors, the probation office, victim impact testimony, and the
statutory sentencing range.
70. Scott, supra note 21, at 45-46; cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005)
(severing provisions from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to make the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines "effectively advisory").
71. United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3 d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 50 (2007) ("[The district court judge] may not presume that the Guidelines range is
reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented."
(internal citation omitted)).
72. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
73. Scott, supra note 21, at 46; cf Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 28, at 1538-39, 1545 (finding
that German prosecutors' sentencing demands anchored German trial judges).
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Presentence reports prepared by probation officers74 and the sentences
recommended by prosecutors and defense attorneys75 likely do serve as
additional anchors. However, instead of crowding the baseline framing effects,
as Scott purports, these anchors would provide second-order baseline
anchoring effects. In a study of the anchoring effects of prosecutorial
sentencing demands, Englich et al. found that, "rather than working against
the prosecutor's initial demand, defense attorneys assimilate their own
sentencing demand to it."7 6 This suggests that sophisticated legal actors anchor
their own sentencing analyses toward initial reference points even when they
have the objective of obtaining lenient sentences for their clients. Probation
officers and attorneys use guideline manuals to develop presentence reports
and sentencing memoranda, and, as suggested by Englich's work, cognitive
biases will skew their sentencing recommendations toward the sentencing
baseline provided by those manuals. Thus, not only do sentencing baselines
directly frame judges' sentencing decisions, but they also create indirect
anchoring effects because the other sentencing anchors -the recommendations
of probation officers and attorneys-are also anchored by the sentencing
baseline.
74. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 2(c)(i) (A) (providing that, with few exceptions, "[t]he probation
officer must conduct a pre-sentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it
imposes [a] sentence"); IND. CODE § 35-38-1-8(a) (2010) ("[A] defendant convicted of a
felony may not be sentenced before a written presentence report is prepared by a probation
officer and considered by the sentencing court."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (2009)
(establishing that, when necessary, probation officers must prepare a presentence report for
the court); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-205 (2010) (requiring the court to direct a presentence
service officer to prepare a presentence report for felony convictions and giving judges
discretion to request such reports for misdemeanors); ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 26.4 (requiring a
presentence report unless the court cannot impose a penalty of more than one year).
75. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1)(C) (providing that the court "must allow the parties'
attorneys to comment on the probation officer's determinations and other matters relating
to an appropriate sentence"); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 390.40 (McKinney 2005) (stating
that attorneys may submit presentence memoranda to the court); N.C. COMM'N ON
INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REPRESENTATION
IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL, Guideline 8.6 (2004) (detailing the
information that attorneys may include in a defense sentencing presentation or
memorandum).
76. Englich et al., Last Word, supra note 28, at 712.
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B. Omission Bias
Like anchoring, the omission bias (or default bias) causes decisionmakers
to favor an initial reference point." However, whereas anchoring is tied to the
use of numbers, the omission bias affects all sentencing regimes, even those
that do not quantify sentencing factors. Ilana Ritov and Jonathan Baron
explain, "Since people are loss averse,... losses are weighed more heavily than
... gains."'7 Accordingly, decisionmakers overvalue the negatives of taking an
action compared to the positives.
The omission bias has influenced major governmental decisions. England
and Japan allowed vaccination requirements for whooping cough to lapse after
the vaccine was reported to have caused a few cases of brain damage, although
death rates are higher without vaccination.79 Government officials believed the
harm from their action (requiring vaccination) was worse than the harm from
their omission (not requiring vaccination).So The omission bias has been
replicated in laboratory experiments, too. In one study, subjects were presented
with the hypothetical choice between giving a child a vaccine that has a risk of
causing death and leaving the child vulnerable to a disease with a greater
probability of death. The majority of subjects chose not to vaccinate.
Generally, subjects explained that actively causing harm was morally worse
than causing harm by omission." Psychologists have also observed the
omission bias in experiments involving decisions about monetary investments,
life-and-death situations, and medical decisions."
77. The terms "omission bias" and "default bias" are often used interchangeably. BARON, supra
note 27, at 300. However, as originally conceived, the omission bias was "the preference for
harm caused by omissions over equal or lesser harm caused by acts." Jonathan Baron & Ilana
Ritov, Omission Bias, Individual Differences, and Normality, 94 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 74, 74 (2004); see also Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance To
Vaccinate: Omission Bias and Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263, 263 (1990)
[hereinafter Ritov & Baron, Reluctance To Vaccinate] (defining omission bias as "the
tendency to favor omissions . . . over otherwise equivalent commissions"). Meanwhile, the
default bias was "used more generally for a bias toward the default." BARON, supra note 27,
at 300.
78. Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49,
49 (1992).
79. BARON, supra note 27, at 514.
go. Id.
81. Ritov & Baron, Reluctance To Vaccinate, supra note 77, at 275.
82. Id.
83. See Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Reference Points and Omission Bias, 59 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 475 (1994) (observing the omission bias in experiments about
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In the context of sentencing, the omission bias may cause judges to
inadequately adjust sentences from the baseline, because judges may prefer the
harms caused by passively applying the default sentence over the harms caused
by actively altering it. Sentencing involves myriad harms that a judge must
consider, including: (1) harm experienced directly by the convicted person,
(2) future crimes committed by the convicted person after his sentence is
completed, (3) future crimes committed because the sentence failed to
accomplish general deterrence, (4) harm experienced by the victim and third
parties because of unfulfilled retributivist desires and fear, and (5) fiscal costs
associated with incarceration and other forms of punishment.
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, "Reckless Endangerment During
Flight" is an aggravating factor,* so a judge's default is not to apply a higher
sentence due to flight. Including the culpability of flight in the Guideline
calculation requires active judicial decisionmaking. If there is uncertainty as to
whether the defendant fled, created a substantial risk, or had the mens rea
required for recklessness," the omission bias would cause the judge to favor
the lower sentence under the Guidelines. Were the base offense level higher
and were lack-of-flight a mitigating factor, the default sentence would reflect
the increased culpability of flight, and the omission bias would lead judges to
prefer passively applying the higher sentence.
There are no studies of the omission bias in generalist judges, and the one
study of the omission bias in specialist judges found that it did not affect the
judges' decisions. 6 However, this study, conducted by Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et
al., tested the omission bias in a context very different from sentencing. In the
Rachlinski et al. study, bankruptcy judges were asked whether they would
discharge $25,000 in credit card debt for a seventy-one-year-old widower who
had spent the credit on living expenses.17 Under the "commission condition,"
monetary investments and pensions); Brian J. Cohen & Stephen G. Pauker, How Do
Physicians Weigh latrogenic Complications?, 9 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 20 (1994) (discussing
the omission bias in the context of medical decisions); Lewis Petrinovich & Patricia O'Neill,
Influence of Wording and Framing Effects on Moral Intuitions, 17 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY
145 (1996) (discussing the omission bias in the context of life-and-death situations); Ilana
Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Outcome Knowledge, Regret, and Omission Bias, 64 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 119 (1995) (noting the omission bias in decisions regarding fetal
testing). But see Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, Omission Bias in Vaccination Decisions:
Where's the "Omission"? Where's the "Bias"?, 91 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
186 (2003) (calling into question the existence of an omission bias).




Rachlinski et al., supra note 28, at 1244.
87. Id. at 1243.
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the judges were told that the widower had lost a $50,000 inheritance that he
had invested in stock." Under the "omission condition," the judges were told
the widower received the $50,000 inheritance as stock and failed to sell it; the
stock subsequently lost all value.8 ' Rachlinski et al. found that the
omission/commission distinction had no effect on the judges' responses.90
Rachlinski et al. explain:
Our problem did not require the judges to assess the culpability of the
act or omission that dissipated the debtor's savings. Rather, the
problem required the judges to assess the debtor's state of mind when
he incurred the credit card debt. Here, the omission or commission
does not speak to that state of mind, but to the causes of the bankruptcy
itself. Nevertheless, we think that if the omission bias plays a role in
judges' thinking, it should have played a role in this problem.9'
The Rachlinski et al. study merely shows that judges are able to overcome
the commission/omission distinction when evaluating a party's state of mind;
it does not speak to the judges' ability to overcome their own preference for
passively causing harm over actively causing harm. While the Rachlinski et al.
study did not test whether judges prefer harms resulting from their omissions
rather than commissions, the studies about monetary investments, life-and-
death situations, and medical decisions do examine the effects of the subjects'
own commissions and omissions. 92 In these arguably more relevant cases, the
nonjudicial subjects exhibited the omission bias.9'
In sum, where uncertainty exists regarding a sentencing factor, the
pervasiveness of the omission bias suggests that a judge would prefer to make
an omission rather than a commission; she would prefer to refrain from
adjusting a sentence based on an uncertain factor. The omission bias, like
anchoring, would thus cause judges to violate the principle of invariance by
imposing sentences closer to the initial reference point, the baseline. The
omission bias and anchoring, therefore, will likely lead to disproportionately
low sentences in a floor baseline regime, disproportionately high sentences in a
ceiling baseline regime, and sentences disproportionately clustered around the
typical sentence in a typical crime baseline regime.
88. Id.
8. Id.
go. Id. at 1244.
91. Id. at 1244-45.
92. See sources cited supra note 83.
93. See sources cited supra note 83.
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C. Status Quo Bias
Unlike anchoring and the omission bias, the status quo bias skews
sentencing toward the normal course of events - typical sentences - not toward
the sentencing baseline. When provided with new options, "decision makers
often stick with the status quo alternative, for example, to follow customary
company policy, to elect an incumbent to still another term in office, to
purchase the same product brands, or to stay in the same job.""
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser observed the status quo bias
in subjects to whom they provided questionnaires containing a series of
decision problems; the experiment varied the framing of the decisions. In the
neutral framing variation, alternative choices were presented with no labels, and
in the status quo framing variation, one of the choices was placed in a status quo
position." The "status quo framing was found to have predictable and
significant effects on subjects' decisionmaking"; it caused the subjects to
strongly favor the status quo option.9' Many legal scholars have noted a similar
status quo bias in judges, as well.9 7
94. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decisionmaking, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
9s. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DENV. U. L.
REv. 7, 19-20 (2007) (identifying the status quo bias as a major force in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' influence after they became advisory in 2005, and asserting that "the
modern history of federal sentencing reforms provides interesting and diverse examples of
status quo biases at work"); Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological
Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines To Stay the Same in Light of Gall,
Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 145
(2008) ("If the only justification for the continued requirement that the Guidelines range be
calculated and considered is that the Court, because of its status quo bias, is hesitant to let
go of a familiar sentencing instrument, then it hardly seems a reasonable aspect of
reasonableness review."); Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias,
and Dress Codes, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 3o6 (2007) ("When courts interpret laws, the judges'
status quo bias may undermine the implementation of laws dictating change. . . . A
preference for the comfort of the familiar heavily influences a reading of [Title VII's
protection against discrimination on the basis of sex] that is at odds with its language and
purpose."); Goutam U. Jois, Stare Decisis Is Cognitive Error, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 63, 98 (2009)
(arguing that the status quo bias contributes to judicial reliance on stare decisis and
explaining that "[w]hen given a pre-existing set of legal rules, judges will be hesitant to
move away from the status quo (status quo bias) and will overvalue the intrinsic worth of
the existing rules (endowment effect)"); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious:
Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1391, 1446 n.244 (2006) ("The primary additional bias that may apply in patent
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Whereas anchoring and the omission bias skew sentencing toward an
artificial reference point, the status quo bias draws decisionmaking toward the
normal course of events. Although often correlated with the omission bias, the
status quo bias may work against reference point biases. For example, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania drivers were given the choice between insurance with
lower rates and limited rights to bring legal actions and insurance with higher
rates and more opportunities to bring legal actions in 1988 and 1990,
respectively.' 8 Both states had the higher-price options as the status quo, but
New Jersey drivers would automatically receive the lower-price option unless
they explicitly requested the higher-priced option, whereas Pennsylvania
drivers had to opt-in to receive the lower-priced option." Eighty-three percent
of New Jersey drivers chose the lower-priced option, and the majority of
Pennsylvania drivers chose the higher-priced option."oo In this real world
experiment, the bias toward inaction, the default bias, overpowered the status
quo bias.
Accordingly, the status quo bias may either strengthen the reference point
biases or mitigate their effects, depending on the culpability of the offender. In
a floor baseline regime, anchoring and the omission bias tend to skew
sentences toward the floor of the sentencing range; thus, the "normal course of
events" sentences are more lenient than in the absence of cognitive error. By
the same reasoning, sentences are harsher in a ceiling baseline regime and
skewed toward the typical sentence in a typical crime baseline regime. The
status quo bias will, generally, reinforce the baseline framing effects because
the normal course of events already reflects such framing. However, because
the status quo bias pulls judicial decisionmaking away from the extremes and
toward the typical, the status quo bias may cause the least culpable defendants
sentenced under a floor baseline regime to receive harsher sentences than they
would in the absence of the status quo bias. Similarly, the most culpable
defendants sentenced in a ceiling baseline regime may receive more lenient
sentences than they would if the status quo bias did not affect sentencing.
cases is the status quo bias . . . ."); Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure:
Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Aluz. L. REv.
655, 704 (2005) (discussing the implications of the status quo bias on consideration of
evidence presented postconviction).
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D. Summary ofBaseline Framing Effects
Although framing effects have not been tested in a courtroom setting, the
laboratory experiments discussed in Part II show that judges are affected by the
framing of legal questions outside of the courtroom. It is unlikely that scholars
will be able to run courtroom experiments for ethical reasons, so we must base
our analysis of judicial cognitive biases on laboratory results. The laboratory
experiments provide a strong basis for predicting that judges commit
decisionmaking errors while performing their official duties. Guthrie et al.
observed:
To the extent that the methods used in this study have identified
thought processes that judges use, the conclusions apply in the
courtroom. After all, increased motivation and incentives "do not
operate by magic: they work by focusing attention and by prolonging
deliberation." Only if increased attention and greater deliberation
enable judges to abandon the heuristics that they are otherwise inclined
to rely upon can they avoid the illusions of judgment that these
heuristics produce. This does not seem likely. "The corrective power of
incentives depends on the nature of the particular error and cannot be
taken for granted.""o'
The robust research on cognitive biases and framing effects suggests that
judges do commit cognitive errors while sentencing and that sentencing
baselines anchor sentences. If this is the case, baseline framing effects caused
by the omission bias and anchoring would generate harsher sentences in a
ceiling baseline regime, lower sentences in a floor baseline regime, and a
disproportionate number of typical sentences in a typical crime baseline
regime. The status quo bias would enhance these framing effects for most
offenders, but it would counterbalance the framing effects for the least culpable
offenders sentenced with a floor baseline and the most culpable offenders
sentenced with a ceiling baseline by pulling decisionmakers toward the typical
sentence. In sum, if judges succumb to cognitive biases, baseline framing
results in the imposition of sentences closer to the sentencing baseline than
those that would be applied if judges were not affected by cognitive error.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Baseline framing interferes with a judge's ability to impose the most just
sentence because cognitive biases cause unreasoned increases and decreases in
criminal sanctions-that is, increases and decreases not justified by the
purposes of sentencing. The following Section discusses the significance of
reasoned sentencing-sentencing wholly justified by valid reasons-for
procedural justice. Relying on an analogy to the burden of proof for conviction,
Section III.B observes that unreasoned increases may offend the United States'
conception of justice more than unreasoned decreases and proposes that
Tennessee's quasi-floor baseline best reflects this American conception of
justice.
A. Reasoned Sentencing and Procedural Justice
Judges are legally and morally compelled to impose "[t]he least restrictive
(punitive) sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes" -the
parsimonious sentence.'o2 However, even without cognitive error, parsimony is
unachievable because there is always uncertainty about the offense and the
effects of punishment, and the purposes of sentencing often conflict with each
other.o3 The inevitable uncertainty about a sentence's substantive justice
102. NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59 (1974); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(20o6) ("The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes [of sentencing] . . . ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-103(2) (2010)
("The sentence imposed should be no greater than that deserved for the offense
committed."); Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1205 (Alaska 1985) ("The defendant's liberty
should be restrained only to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the objectives of
sentencing."); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 63 (James T. McHugh
ed., Prometheus Books 2009) (1830) ("All punishment being in itself evil, upon the
principle of utility, . . . it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some
greater evil."); MORRIS, supra, at 61 ("T[he] [parsimony] principle is utilitarian and
humanitarian; its justification is somewhat obvious since any punitive suffering beyond
societal need is, in th[e] context [of imprisonment], what defines cruelty.").
103. Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REv. 67, 75-76 (2005) (contending that
sentencing principles "often conflict with each other" and analyzing those conflicts); see, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (20o6) (codifying the purposes of sentencing as "the need for the
sentence imposed -(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner"); BARON, supra note 27, at 56 (listing
"punishment without deterrence" as a cognitive bias); BENTHAM, supra note 102, at 63
(arguing that the goal of sentencing should be deterrence); SANDFORD H. KADISH ET AL.,
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strengthens the significance of procedural justice. Because there are no
verifiable accurate sentences, fair procedures are the only way to ensure that the
law is administered equally and that sentences are not imposed based on
arbitrary considerations.xo4
Reasoned sentencing is essential for procedural justice. Marvin Frankel,
"the father of sentencing reform,"o' explained that "the requirement of stated
reasons [for sentences] is a powerful safeguard against rash and arbitrary
decisions.",,o 6 Similarly, in his seminal article "Some Kind of Hearing," Judge
Henry Friendly identified eleven attributes fundamental to a fair hearing,
including the right to have the decision based only on the evidence presented
(element six) and the making of a statement of reasons (element nine). o7 The
latter attribute requires judicial decisions to be reasoned, and the former
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 79-105 (8th ed. 2007) (presenting
the major arguments for and against retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 1o (John Ladd
ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1965) (1797) ("Only the Law of retribution (jus talionis) can
determine exactly the kind and degree of punishment.. . . All other standards ... cannot be
compatible with the principle of pure and strict legal justice."); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP (1984) (examining the rehabilitative
justifications for punishment); MORIUS, supra note 102, at 61 (arguing that retribution
should be limited by utilitarian principles); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME, at v (1995) ("Of all
the justifications for criminal punishment, the desire to incapacitate is . . . often the most
important."); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(2003) (summarizing the United States' jurisprudential move toward rehabilitation in the
1970s and its subsequent move toward retribution); Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Principles
in Theory and Practice, 22 CRIME & JUST. 363 (1997) (contrasting Norval Morris's holistic
"limiting retributivist" theory with Andrew von Hirsch's greater emphasis on retribution
and equality); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 85,
107 (2003) (lamenting the state of retributivism in the United States and claiming that
"[t]he choice we face is ... not a choice between patronizing rehabilitation and equalizing
retribution" but "between patronizing rehabilitation and degrading retribution"); see also
Robert Martinson, What Works?- Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
22, 25 (1974) (concluding that rehabilitative efforts in prisons did not have an effect on
recidivism). But see Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243, 252 (1979) (questioning his earlier
conclusions that rehabilitation failed to prevent recidivism).
104. Cf MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973) (describing
unchecked sentencing authority as "terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes
devotion to the rule of law").
105. 128 CONG. REc. 26,503 (1982) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
io6. FRANKEL, supra note 104, at 41.
107. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind ofHearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1282, 1291 (1975).
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attribute implies that factors not presented to the court, like cognitive biases,
have no place in a judge's final decision.
The federal government and several states have codified the requirement
that sentences be justified by valid reasons and that those reasons be presented
to the public. For example, under federal law, "[t]he court, at the time of
sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence."os Similarly, in Pennsylvania, "the court shall make as a
part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a
statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed."log
The Supreme Court explained, "After settling on the appropriate sentence,
[the judge] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.""o No reasonable person would find baseline framing to be a valid
reason for a particular sentence or a mechanism for promoting the "perception
of fair sentencing." Yet, any sentencing guidelines that contain baselines will
create baseline framing effects that cause unreasoned punishment or
unreasoned lenity. The next Section discusses how policymakers might fairly
account for baseline framing when designing sentencing guidelines.
B. Choosing a Baseline
Unreasoned sentencing caused by baseline framing could be avoided by
implementing sentencing regimes with little procedural guidance that lack
baselines."' However, the harm caused by baseline framing pales in
comparison to the arbitrariness and disparity caused by unbounded
discretion."' Criticizing federal sentencing before the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were promulgated, Frankel warned, "[Tihe almost wholly
unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of
108. 18 U.S.C. 5 3553(c).
1og. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9721(b) (Supp. 2010); see also 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4-1(c) (2010)
(requiring trial judges imposing sentences for particular offenses to "specify on the record
the particular evidence, information, factors in mitigation and aggravation or other reasons
that led to [their] sentencing determination"); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.120(1) (2009) ("The
court shall state on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed.").
no. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
in. Connecticut, for example, provides judges only with broad statutory sentencing ranges for
felonies and no starting point for their sentencing analysis. CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 53a-35a
(2011).
112. See FRANKEL, supra note 104 (igniting the sentencing reform movement in order to reduce
sentencing arbitrariness by implementing sentencing guidelines).
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sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to
the rule of law.""' Moreover, eliminating baseline framing would not avoid all
cognitive biases. Biases would still be generated by other anchors, like
attorneys' sentencing recommendations11 4 and journalists' suggestions,"s
which would become more influential if there were no baseline to initially
anchor the sentencing analysis. Accordingly, this Note does not advise
eliminating sentencing guidelines. Instead, it urges legislatures and sentencing
commissions to improve sentencing guidelines by selecting baselines in light of
baseline framing effects.
Policymakers who want to minimize the number of sentences skewed by
cognitive error should implement a typical crime baseline. The typical crime
baseline anchors sentences for typical offenders to the sentences they would
receive if there were no baseline framing. Thus, under a typical crime baseline,
baseline framing would not cause judges to adjust typical offenders' sentences.
This will also occur for the most culpable offenders sentenced under a ceiling
baseline regime and the least culpable offenders sentenced under a floor
baseline regime, but there are more typical offenders than highly or minimally
culpable offenders.
On the other hand, policymakers may prefer accepting a greater number of
unreasoned sentences overall in order to better limit the number of unreasoned
increases in sentences. If so, they should implement a baseline lower than the
typical crime baseline.
As discussed in Section III.A, judges and policymakers have no way to
identify the parsimonious sentence, nor have they agreed on which factors
should determine which sentence is parsimonious. "6 Instead, trial judges are
entrusted to determine which sentence is parsimonious."' A judge's reasoned
sentences best reflect her judgment of parsimony because these sentences are
113. Id. at 5.
114. Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia's Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom
Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 LAw & POL'Y 497, 510-11 (2006) (noting that
the order in which attorneys present their sentencing demands affects the fairness of judicial
decisions because of anchoring effects); Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 28, at 1538-39,
1545 (finding that prosecutorial sentencing demands affect imposed sentences in Germany);
Guthrie et al., supra note 28, at 794 ("[T]he influence on judges of biased or misleading
anchors, such as prosecutor or defense attorney sentencing recommendations, can produce
biased criminal sentences.").
115. Englich et al., Playing Dice, supra note 28, at 191 (discussing anchoring effects observed
when legal professionals were presented with a journalist's suggested sentence for an alleged
rape before being asked to make a sentencing decision).
116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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unaffected by cognitive biases; therefore, when choosing a sentencing baseline
policymakers should treat reasoned sentences as the best approximation of
parsimonious sentences. This Section proceeds by treating reasoned sentences
as substitutes for parsimonious sentences.
Generally, judges may err by imposing a sentence that is higher or lower
than the reasoned sentence. If the reasoned sentence for a particular offender is
ten years, then an eleven-year sentence and a nine-year sentence are both
"inaccurate" by one year. This Note will refer to the eleven-year sentence and
other sentencing increases that do not fulfill the purposes of sentencing as
Type I errors, and it will refer to the nine-year sentence and other failures to
increase sentences as Type II errors.
For questions of guilt and innocence, U.S. criminal law accepts a greater
number of errors overall in order to better avoid Type I errors (convicting
innocent defendants). As the Supreme Court has explained, "The principle that
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted
law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law.""' The presumption of innocence is
only overcome by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,"' which results in a high
number of Type II errors (acquitting guilty defendants) but limits the number
of Type I errors.
Type I errors at conviction and sentencing both result in undeserved
punishment, and Type II errors at both stages result in inadequate
punishment. Because errors at conviction and sentencing cause similar harm,
legal theorists' moral judgments about the fairest ratio between Type I and
Type II errors at conviction are helpful in determining the most just ratio of
Type I to Type II errors for sentencing. Intuitively, convicting an innocent
person offends justice significantly more than sentencing a guilty person to
more time than he deserves. Similarly, a guilty person going unpunished
offends justice more than a guilty person receiving a lighter sentence than he
deserves. Although the magnitude of Type I and Type II errors differs between
conviction and sentencing, the ratio of their harm may possibly remain
constant.
118. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1894).
11g. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 500 (1896) (" [The presumption of innocence] is driven
out of the case when the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime as
charged has been committed . . . ."); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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American law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is rooted in William
Blackstone's maxim that it is "better that ten guilty persons escape, than that
one innocent suffer." 2 o Judge Richard Posner reasons that "because the cost to
an innocent defendant of criminal punishment may well exceed the social
benefit of one more conviction of a guilty person . . . , type I errors are more
serious than type II errors in criminal cases.""' Many legal theorists have
shared Blackstone's and Posner's preference for Type II errors over Type I
errors, including Benjamin Franklin ("[lit is better a hundred guilty persons
should escape than that one innocent person should suffer"); 22 Judge
Benjamin Cardozo ("[I]t is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished
than one innocent person should die");" Judge Henry Friendly ("[I]t is better
to allow a considerable number of guilty persons to go free than to convict any
appreciable number of innocent men"); and many others."2 s The preference
for mistaken innocence over mistaken guilt is expressed in Scripture, as well,
when Abraham pleads with God to spare Sodom:
Abraham drew near, and said, Wilt thou also destroy the righteous
with the wicked?
Peradventure there be fifty righteous within the city: wilt thou also
destroy and not spare the place for the fifty righteous that are therein?
120. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see also Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174, 210 (1997) (tracing legal and moral thought about the ideal ratio
between Type I and Type II errors for guilt and innocence).
121. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 366 (2001).
122. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 2 THE WORKS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN; CONTAINING SEVERAL POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL TRACTS NOT
INCLUDED IN ANY FORMER EDITION, AND MANY LETTERS OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE NOT
HITHERTO PUBLISHED; WITH NOTES AND A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR 478, 480 (Jared Sparks ed.,
Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1836). The sources cited here and infra notes 123-128 are
compiled in Volokh, supra note 120.
123. People v. Galbo, 112 N.E. 1041, io44 (N.Y. 1916) (citing 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA
PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 (Lawbook Exch.,
Ltd. 2003) (1736)). But see Volokh, supra note 120, at 175 n.12 (suggesting that Cardozo may
have preferred a ten-to-one ratio for imprisonment).
124. Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 694 (1968).
125. See generally Volokh, supra note 120, at 187-90 (cataloging dozens of legal theorists who
prefer Type I errors). But see Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Jan.
2012) (hypothesizing that the "fixat[ion] on mistaken convictions of the innocent" is a result
of framing effects and cognitive error); Volokh, supra note 120, at 195-97 (noting that
Jeremy Bentham, Otto von Bismarck, and others have expressed skepticism about the
maxim that it is better to acquit the guilty than convict the innocent).
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That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with
the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far
from thee: Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?
And the LORD said, If I find in Sodom fifty righteous within the city,
then I will spare all the place for their sakes. 6
After further negotiation, Abraham said, "Oh let not the Lord be angry, and
I will speak yet but this once: Peradventure ten shall be found there. And he
said, I will not destroy it for ten's sake.""' The Jewish philosopher
Maimonides interpreted God and Abraham's debate to be even more
disapproving of Type I errors, explaining, "[I]t is better and more satisfactory
to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man to death
once in a way.".
American law has embraced Blackstone's preference for Type II errors over
Type I errors, 9 and this preference counsels in favor of implementing a
baseline that better prevents Type I errors caused by baseline framing. Of the
baselines that could feasibly be implemented, Tennessee's quasi-floor baseline
best approaches Blackstone's ten-to-one ratio. As discussed in Section I.B,
Tennessee's sentencing baseline is at the statutory minimum for offenders who
are not "especially mitigated."o When baseline framing alters sentences in
Tennessee, it will cause unreasoned decreases in punishment for the majority
of convicted felons (those not especially mitigated), and it will cause
unreasoned increases for especially mitigated offenders. Therefore, just as the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard creates a Blackstonian ratio for
conviction (a greater number of Type II errors for every Type I error), the
quasi-floor baseline creates a Blackstonian ratio for sentencing.
C. Ratcheting Up and the Quasi-Floor Baseline
This Note suggests that policymakers who want to avoid Type I errors
should prefer quasi-floor baseline regimes because they reduce the amount of
unreasoned punishment, not because they result in lower sentences. In fact,
126. Genesis 18:23-26 (King James).
127. Id. at 18:32.
128. 2 MAIMONIDES, THE COMMANDMENTS: SEFER HA-MITZVOTH OF MAIMONIDES 270 (Charles
B. Chavel trans., 1967) (c. 12th century).
129. See Volokh, supra note 120, at 174, 210 (describing the prominence of Blackstone's ten-to-one
ratio for conviction).
130. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-lo9(b) (2010); see id. § 40-35-210(c)(1).
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quasi-floor baselines might lead to higher sentences overall. Legislatures and
their constituents may perceive lower baselines as weakening criminal
sanctions, inclining legislatures to raise criminal penalties. Several leading
scholars have observed that criminal law legislation tends to be a "one-way
ratchet.""3 ' Similarly, prosecutors may bring heftier charges and seek harsher
punishments to correct for any perceived decrease in punishment.'
Legislative and prosecutorial ratcheting up informs judges about society's
substantive views about punishment without affecting the fairness of
sentencing procedures. Thus, quasi-floor baselines could make sentencing
procedures more just by minimizing unreasoned increases in punishment
while, at the same time, leading to higher reasoned sentences.
CONCLUSION
Judges have a great deal of autonomy in making life-altering decisions
during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings. Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote, "[A] motion to [the discretion of the court] is a motion, not to
its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound
legal principles."' Where baseline framing increases a defendant's sentence,
the judge deprives a person of life, liberty, and/or property based on her
inclination, not her judgment. This Note suggests that Tennessee's quasi-floor
baseline best reflects the United States' preference for avoiding Type I errors,
even though the quasi-floor baseline may result in a greater total number of
errors. Policymakers, however, might value avoiding Type I and Type II errors
equally, in which case a typical crime baseline would be desirable because that
baseline results in the lowest amount of unreasoned sentencing overall.' 4
131. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REv. 223, 223 (2007) (quoting
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509, 547
(2001)); see also Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of
Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REv. 293, 301 (2005) ("[L]egislative adjustments to
federal sentencing policy have been a one-way ratchet for twenty years."); cf MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS Of MASS INCARCERATION IN
AMEICA 249 (20o6) (describing the risk of "leveling down" in the United States by which
penalties are raised, not lowered, to correct for disparity).
132. Cf Stuntz, supra note 131, at 509 ("As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law,
determine who goes to prison and for how long.").
133. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14 ,692(d)) (Marshall, C.J.).
134. See supra Section III.B (explaining why the typical crime baseline best limits unreasoned
sentencing); see also Volokh, supra note 120, 187 n.98, 188 n.1o4, 189 nn.i18 & 124 (citing a
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Whichever ratio legislatures and sentencing commissions deem fairest, it is
essential that they consider baseline framing effects when designing sentencing
guidelines in order to establish the most just sentencing procedures.
minority of scholars who support a one-to-one ratio for execution, conviction,
imprisonment, and punishment, respectively).
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